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The Belarusian opposition is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since Alyaksandr Lukashen-
ka took power in 1994. Following many months of negotiations, opposition leaders failed to 
select a joint candidate for the presidential election scheduled for 11th October. The failure of this 
latest round of talks has proven that not only is the opposition unlikely to threaten Lukashenka’s 
rule; it will not even be able to demonstrate to society that it could provide a genuine alternative 
to the present government. 
The presidential election in 2010 was a painful landmark for the opposition. The repression that ac-
companied the election has largely weakened political circles opposed to the government. Against 
this backdrop, the traditional internal problems of the opposition have worsened, such as its inca-
pacity to reach agreement and develop a common, coherent operational strategy, the excessive 
ambitions of the leaders of particular groups, the low level of political maturity, mutual distrust and 
frequent personal conflicts. As a result the opposition has for years been unable to gain confidence 
in society and reach beyond the limited number (20%) of staunch proponents of democratic trans-
formations. Given the fact that the Belarusian opposition is fragmented and lacks one clear leader, 
the readiness to support individual leaders does not exceed several per cent, according to independ-
ent surveys. Lukashenka’s present political opponents rather resemble a group of dissidents, than 
constitute a genuine opposition to the government. The crisis and helplessness of opposition circles 
are more acute given Belarus’s internal situation since for the first time Alyaksandr Lukashenka will 
run his presidential campaign in the context of the economic crisis and a forecasted fall in GDP. 
The opposition and the political system 
One of the characteristic features of the author-
itarian regime established by Lukashenka is the 
fact that there is no single party with a hold 
on power. In Belarus there are several officially 
registered political parties which endorse the 
politics of the government, for example the Be-
larusian Agrarian Party, the Belarusian Patriotic 
Party or the Belarusian Social and Sports Party. 
They are however façade parties which do not 
have any significance in the country’s political 
life. Lukashenka has based his power on a hier-
archical system of verticals which is composed of 
the loyal nomenclature, officials and an extensive 
security system. This manner of ruling a state is 
aimed at eliminating the possibility that another 
centre of power, besides from the presidential 
one, could emerge and consolidate. For this rea-
son the very idea of a party system is discredited 
in the regime’s ideology as pathogenic and not 
serving the interests of Belarusian society. It par-
ticularly concerns opposition parties and groups. 
For 20 years of Lukashenka’s rule the regime has 
subjected the opposition to a repressive policy 
and referred to it as a ‘fifth column’. 
Repression can take many forms: from prison 
sentences, frequent arrests, dismissals from jobs 
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or education establishments, to other forms of 
everyday intimidation. The application of similar 
methods is supposed to warn society against 
becoming involved and supporting the opposi-
tion. The Belarusian government, however, has 
not decided to wipe out the institutional opposi-
tion completely1. Its existence is intended to give 
the impression of political pluralism in Belarus, 
confirming the state’s democratic and modern 
character. Furthermore, the legal opposition 
(which is subject to legal regulations) channels 
a part of social discontent and thus makes it easi-
er for it to be controlled by the security services2. 
However, when it feels threatened, Lukashenka’s 
regime does not hesitate to use direct violence 
against opposition members. Following the 
brutally quelled demonstration after the presi-
dential election held in December 2010 seven 
presidential candidates were arrested. Some of 
them were given prison sentences. One of them, 
Mikalay Statkevich remains imprisoned. Sever-
al candidates were forced to leave the country 
following persecution. Hundreds of opposition 
activists were victims of repression. 
The present state of the opposition 
The opposition in Belarus is quite diverse; 
it encompasses groups which vary in their ide-
ologies, ranging from communists and liberals, 
former members of the Soviet nomenclature to 
youth national activists. The fundamental crite-
rion shared by all is their declared opposition to 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s rule.
1 This publication covers the topic of the institutional op-
position in Belarus, that is bodies which see themselves 
as and which are perceived as being political formation. 
In the broader context, all organisations and persons 
declaring their opposition to the authoritarian regime of 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka are termed ‘opposition circles’, 
including non-governmental organisations, civic initia-
tives, youth organisations, human rights champions, 
cultural associations, organisations which represent na-
tional minorities and the independent media. 
2 It is impossible to determine clearly the extent to which 
the opposition circles are infiltrated by the security ser-
vices. However, on the basis of what has been reported 
so far it may be assumed that the opposition is constant-
ly being infiltrated, with varying degrees. 
The Belarusian opposition forces claim to have 
several thousand activists. It should however be 
noted that the data provided by the opposition 
parties and movements are usually inflated. 
Furthermore, apart from leaders in Minsk and 
in the regions, the majority of the rank and file 
do not actually participate in their parties’ ac-
tivity or in social activity. The opposition focus-
es its activity above all on subsequent election 
campaigns (which is manifested mainly in the 
high intensity of leadership meetings), while 
everyday work between campaigns remains 
relatively less significant. Furthermore, a large 
part of the activity is Internet-based that often 
serves as a substitute for everyday activity in the 
public sphere. Another growing problem for 
the opposition is the lack of intergenerational 
change. Many leaders of the opposition parties 
have remained in their positions for years3.
The Belarusian opposition parties and move-
ments cannot reach agreement in such funda-
mental issues as choosing a joint candidate for 
presidential elections or a possible boycott of 
elections. The inability of opposition leaders to 
develop a long-term political and social strat-
egy which would be adapted to the situation 
does not reflect well on their political maturi-
ty. Furthermore, the opposition leaders rarely 
establish genuine co-operation with experts in 
Belarus. Many of their demands are confined 
to formulas which have been repeated for 
20 years (such as ‘the range of participants 
3 For example, Anatol Lyabedzka has been at the helm of 
the United Civic Party of Belarus since 2000, Stanislau 
Shushkevich has been the leader of the Belarusian Social 
Democratic Assembly since 1998, Syarhey Kalyakin has 
been the leader of the Belarusian Party of Communists 
since 1994 (since 2009 it has been functioning as the 
Belarusian Left Party ‘A Just World’). 
Lukashenka’s present political opponents 
rather resemble a group of dissidents, 
than constitute a genuine opposition to 
the government.
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in the political process should be extended’) 
or do not sound very appropriate or realistic 
(e.g. ‘a million new jobs’). The low level of mu-
tual trust among the opposition leaders does 
not contribute to the opposition’s cohesion. 
Personal conflicts, mutual accusations of de-
structive actions and collaboration with the se-
curity services are a permanent element of the 
life of the opposition parties and movements. 
The above factors have led to a low level of con-
fidence and popularity of the opposition in Be-
larusian society4. This is also linked to the low 
potential for mobilisation of opposition circles, 
their inability to reach out to a broader social 
section. Actions and appeals which ‘preach to 
the converted’, that is proponents of democratic 
transformations, in fact cause the opposition to 
constantly seek favours of the same electorate. 
There is no doubt that the general inertia of Be-
larusian society, which has been effectively pre-
served by the repressive regime, is an additional 
challenge for the functioning of the opposition5. 
A slight majority of Belarusians declare they would 
be in favour of reforms intended to improve the 
economic situation in the country, while simul-
taneously they claim they are not ready to bear 
the costs of such reforms6. The majority of Bela-
rusians seem to believe that it is Lukashenka, not 
the opposition, who has the formula for solving 
the country’s present economic problems. Few 
demonstrations of social discontent, e.g. by small 
business owners, were staged by those outside 
the institutional opposition. 
Western donors are also becoming disillusioned 
with the Belarusian opposition. In the present 
situation they see more benefits in support-
ing long-term projects aiming at building and 
4 According to the surveys conducted on 5th March 2015 
by the independent polling centre NISEPI, registered 
in Vilnius, 18.8% of the respondents declared they had 
confidence in the opposition and 57.4% declared they 
did not trust it. 
5 According to the NISEPI institute’s December 2014 sur-
veys, almost 80% of Belarusians declared they were not 
ready to participate in mass protests in case elections 
results were fixed. However, according to the NISEPI 
June 2015 surveys, fewer than 10% of the respondents 
admitted that street protests are ‘the most realistic and 
desirable way of making changes’. 
6 Compare http://www.belinstitute.eu/ru/node/2534 
strengthening Belarusian identity. Even Lidzi-
ya Yarmoshyna, the chairwoman of the Central 
Election Commission of Belarus who supports 
Lukashenka, has been mocking the opposition’s 
excessive passivity7.
At present, the opposition forces are basically 
divided into two main coalitions. The first one 
is the alliance of parties which coordinate the 
‘people’s referendum’. It is mainly composed 
of: the BPF Party, the ‘Movement for Free-
dom’, the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly). 
The campaign of the ‘people’s referendum’, 
which was launched in 2013, is an attempt to 
reach out to Belarusian society through collect-
ing signatures of support for the proposed so-
cio-political reforms. The proposed reforms con-
sist of six questions and include e.g.: the need 
to keep access to education and healthcare free 
of charge, to limit the president to two terms 
in office, and support for integration with the 
EU. The authors of the campaign, besides their 
intention to make use of the action in order to 
target a wider social base, have declared they 
wanted to collect 500,000 signatures which 
would then be transferred to the administra-
tion to be verified and to hold a nationwide 





8 The declarations are rather wishful thinking, even when 
one does not take into account the fact that the Cen-
tral Election Commission is subordinated to the govern-
ment. In line with the stipulations of the Belarusian elec-
tion code Belarusian citizens have the right to initiate 
a referendum; however, the group which initiates the 
referendum needs to collect 450,000 valid signatures 
within two months. 
The opposition has for years been unable 
to develop a common strategy for its ac-
tivity. Nor has it reached agreement about 
presenting a joint candidate for the presi-
dential election to be held in 2015.
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announced that 50,000 people had signed the 
petition, on 4 February it was 90,000, and on 
20 May 2015 during an Internet-based confer-
ence one of the leaders of the action Tatsyana 
Karatkevich said that 120,000 signatures had 
been collected. Contrary to the announce-
ment and declarations of the campaign’s lead-
ers, it has not made a wide impact in society. 
The second coalition is the Talaka Civil Alliance 
for Fair and Honest Elections for a Better Life, 
which was established in September 2013. It is 
composed above all of two parties: the liberal 
United Civic Party of Belarus and the post-Com-
munist Belarusian Left Party ‘A Just World’. This 
alliance is rather tactical, motivated by the will 
to find an ally by the parties which have not 
joined the ‘people’s referendum’ campaign. 
The leaders of both parties have announced 
that they will separately seek to be appointed 
a candidate in this year’s presidential election, 
which proves the alliance is ineffective. 
The preparations  
for the presidential election 
The question of choosing a joint candidate has 
been the main topic of discussions and disputes 
of the opposition in the last two years. Initially, 
the two main coalitions were unable to reach 
agreement about the way in which the candi-
date would be selected. After the concept of 
holding a joint congress had prevailed, negoti-
ations about the modes of selecting delegates 
for the congress were launched. The so-called 
‘seven’ took part in them, that is four main 
parties forming the ‘people’s referendum’, two 
from Talaka and the organisational committee 
of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party. 
In November 2014 it was announced, in an at-
mosphere of mutual accusations and allega-
tions, that the attempt to reach an agreement 
had failed and the topic of a joint candidate 
and the congress was deemed to be closed. 
In consequence, the following persons, among 
others, declared they were willing to be the op-
position candidate in this year’s election9:
Tatsyana Karatkevich – she presents herself 
as a candidate of the ‘people’s referendum’. 
In fact, only the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and 
the BPF Party have declared support for her 
candidacy. The Belarusian Social Democratic 
Party (Assembly) has announced that it will not 
appoint or support any candidate (which is odd 
since Karatkevich, besides her involvement in 
the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign is also a member 
of ‘Assembly’). The ‘Movement for Freedom’, 
led by Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the former can-
didate in the 2006 presidential election, has 
also announced that he will not endorse any 
candidate. Despite this it can be inferred from 
what the leaders of the parties forming the 
‘people’s referendum’ say that the rank and file 
of ‘Assembly’ and the ‘Movement for Freedom’ 
may become involved in the organisation of the 
Karatkevich election campaign. 
Anatol Lyabedzka – whose candidacy has been 
submitted by the United Civic Party of Belarus 
of which he is the chairman. 
Syarhey Kalyakin– appointed by the Belarusian 
Left Party ‘A Just World’ of which he is the leader. 
Also Syarhey Haydukevich, the leader of the 
pro-Lukashenka Liberal Democratic Party, has 
declared his readiness to run in the presiden-
tial election. Haydukevich, who is called a tradi-
tional sparring partner for Lukashenka, already 
participated in the elections as a candidate 
9 The election ranking (an open question) of the opposi-
tion leaders, developed on the basis of the NISEPI sur-
vey, conducted in June this year, is the following: Mika-
lay Statkevich 5% (in the previous survey of March this 
year, 4.5%), Uladzimir Nyaklyaeu 4.7% (in March this 
year, 7.6%), Anatol Lyabedzka 4.2% (in March this year, 
2.9%), Syarhey Kalyakin 3.1% (in March this year, 1.6%), 
Tatsyana Karatkevich 1.1% (she was not included in the 
March 2015 survey). 
The opposition leaders have failed both in 
agreeing on a boycott of the election and 
in jointly supporting the symbolic candi-
dacy of imprisoned Mikalay Statkevich.
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in 2001 and 2006. In 2010, after the govern-
ment had decided to implement the election 
scenario with the participation of as many as 
10 candidates, Haydukevich withdrew his can-
didacy just before the election. 
The opposition has not also succeeded in reach-
ing agreement about a possible common boy-
cott of the election. This option, which stems 
from the conviction that the state administra-
tion, being subordinated to Lukashenka, fixes 
election results, is traditionally considered before 
the elections. This year the concept of a boycott 
would be linked with the opposition proposing 
the symbolic candidacy of Mikalay Statkevich10, 
a candidate in the 2010 presidential election who 
is still serving a prison sentence11. This action 
would in fact be an information campaign on po-
litical prisoners, Belarus’s repressive regime, and 
the lack of sense of the election process in this 
situation. Disputes have already appeared at the 
stage of opposition leaders ascribing themselves 
the authorship of the idea and then different 
scenarios of its realisation. Certain leaders have 
opted for announcing Statkevich as a symbolic, 
common candidate of the opposition, and when 
the registration of his initiative group is refused, 
to call for a complete boycott of the election. 
Another section of the opposition leaders declared 
that they could use the participation in the elec-
tion and the collection of signatures in support 
of a real candidacy to inform society about Stat-
kevich and other political prisoners12 (possibly to 
collect signatures in support of their release). Nor 
have talks between opposition leaders led to the 
development of a common strategy in this area. 
10 Thus the opposition would circumvent the ban on open-
ly calling for a boycott which was introduced to the elec-
toral code following the amendments made in Novem-
ber 2013.
11 The Belarusian electoral law prohibits a person being 
registered as a candidate if they are serving a prison 
sentence. Members of the Central Election Commission 
of Belarus have unanimously declared that they will not 
register the Statkevich initiative group. 
12 The Belarusian organisations of human rights defenders 
(the Vyasna (Spring) Human Rights Center, the Belaru-
sian Helsinki Committee) at present recognise that there 
are six political prisoners in Belarus. 
As a result of further misunderstandings inside 
the opposition, Uladzimir Nyaklyaeu, the leader 
of the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the most 
popular opposition politician in recent years, 
has announced he is leaving the ‘Tell the Truth’ 
campaign13 and the opposition structures in 
general. He has also announced that he is go-
ing to establish a new social movement ‘For the 
Statehood and Independence of Belarus’. Nyak-
lyaeu’s initiative is in fact another attempt to 
renew opposition structures by building a so-
called third force (apart from the government 
and the institutional opposition). Its objective 
would be to transcend the current mobilisa-
tion limitations of the opposition, by referring 
to such common values as statehood and in-
dependence, and to gain wide social support. 
This is not a new idea. Similar motivations for 
establishing a large social movement were de-
clared by: Alyaksandr Kazulin14 who formed the 
‘People’s Will’ movement in 2006, Alyaksandr 
Milinkevich who established the ‘Movement 
for Freedom’ in 2006 and Nyaklyaeu himself 
since in 2010 he launched the ‘Tell the Truth’ 
campaign. It appears that the newly launched 
movement will encounter the same problems as 
its predecessors. It is not enough for someone 
to state they are not part of the compromised 
opposition in order to gain a better status 
13 Andrey Dzmitryeu was appointed the new leader of the 
‘Tell the Truth’ campaign. In the 2010 presidential elec-
tion he was the head of the election team of Nyaklyaeu. 
After he was detained during a post-election protest, 
Dzmitryeu appeared on TV with an announcement jus-
tifying the brutal action taken by the police (militsiya), 
which has sparked a lot of controversy and accusations 
in the opposition circles.
14 Alyaksandr Kazulin, between 2005 and 2008 the leader 
of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly), an 
opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election. 
Falls in support for Lukashenka do not 
lead to a substantial increase in the op-
position’s popularity and confidence in it.
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in the eyes of society, since society is not quite 
aware of the details of the opposition’s internal 
schisms. Furthermore, as the surveys indicate, 
Belarusian society does not have a sense of the 
state’s independence being threatened. Para-
doxically, also the slogans of independence and 
statehood have been to a large extent hijacked 
by Alyaksandr Lukashenka who has started in-
cluding topics underlining the distinctiveness 
of Belarus and the Belarusian nation in the of-
ficial circuit after 2000. This rhetoric has been 
intensified over the last year, in the face of the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine and the promotion 
of the idea of the ‘Russian world’.
The opposition and its external and 
internal challenges 
The events in Ukraine have caused many Bela-
rusian citizens to experience a sense of threat 
of internal chaos and destabilisation, which has 
had a fundamental impact on the opposition’s 
situation. According to surveys, the majority of 
Belarusian society interprets the Ukrainian-Rus-
sian conflict and the war in the east of Ukraine in 
line with Russian propaganda15, i.e. as a result of 
protests on Kyiv’s Maidan, and not the Russian 
invasion. The government in Minsk is trying to 
use these elements for its own purposes by em-
phasising, as part of its propaganda, Belarus’s 
stability. This is crucial, particularly with regard 
to the present economic challenges16. Belarus’s 
GDP for January-May 2015 fell by 3% (according 
to the International Monetary Fund’s forecasts, 
15 According to the surveys conducted in March this year by 
the Belarusian Analytical Workroom, registered in War-
saw, 65.7% deemed the annexation of Crimea by Russia 
well-founded and justified, compare http://www.belaw.
eu/?p=1384. According to the survey of March this year, 
conducted by the NISEPI institute, 58.5% of the respon-
dents believed Russia’s annexation of Crimea to be an act 
of historical justice, compare http://www.iiseps.org/reliz. 
16 In previous years, there were presidential elections in 
which Lukashenka gained re-election, both GDP and 
Belarusians’ real revenues grew substantially. In 2001 
Belarus’s GDP increased by 4.7% and its real revenue by 
28.1%; in 2006 respectively by 10% and 15.9%; and in 
2010 by 7.7% and 14.8%.
in 2015 it will decrease by 2.3%, and accord-
ing to the World Bank, by 3.5%). Foreign trade, 
including exports, in this period fell sharply 
(by 28.3%). This was mainly due to the economic 
recession in Russia, which is Belarus’s main trad-
ing partner – in 2014 Russia accounted for 50% 
of all trade. Between January and April 2015 real 
revenues of Belarusians also dropped by 4.2%. 
According to the NISEPI surveys of June 2015, 
72% of respondents stated that the Belarusian 
economy is in crisis and 80.6% feared another 
devaluation of the Belarusian ruble (the previous 
one took place in December 2014). However, the 
present economic situation has not contributed 
to Belarusian society being more prepared to 
engage in protests. Lacking a real alternative, 
many Belarusians see Lukashenka as the guaran-
tor of the state’s stability17 and hope he will im-
prove the situation. The Belarusian opposition, 
out of its weakness, has not only been unable 
to use the present economic problems to its 
advantage, it was also unsuccessful during the 
economic downturn in 2011 when, following 
the crisis and two devaluations of the Belarusian 
currency, support for Lukashenka fell to approxi-
mately 20% (according to the NISEPI data in June 
this year it was at 38.6%). This decline, however, 
has not led to increased popularity and confi-
dence in the opposition. Additionally discredited 
street protests in the eyes of Belarusian society 
following the Maidan demonstrations present 
another difficult challenge for the opposition. 
In the last presidential campaigns the opposi-
tion presented the idea of a mass protest (often 
termed ‘Ploshcha’ – a ‘square’) as a fundamental 
or even the only possible way of bringing about 
a change in power in Belarus. Confronted with 
this new situation, the opposition leaders have 
17 Even certain opposition representatives openly admit 
that faced with a tense geopolitical situation in the re-
gion and Belarus’s economic problems, they would not 
be able to guarantee the security and stability of the 
state, compare e.g. https://nash-dom.info/?p=32608: 
Официальное заявление Гражданской Кампании 
“Наш Дом” по поводу участия в президентских 
выборах-2015 года.
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unanimously distanced themselves from the 
willingness to organise the traditional post-elec-
tion protests18. This reluctance stems not only 
from the lack of support for the concept of pro-
test in Belarusian society but also from the fear 
of Russia’s aggressive position when such pro-
tests break out. The opposition has thus been 
deprived of one of the main tools of its activi-
ty. Also due to the new geopolitical situation, 
the topic of Russia has not appeared so far in 
internal debates and disputes of Lukashenka’s 
opponents in the context of this year’s election. 
Accusations of Russian financial support be-
tween rivals in the presidential campaigns in 
2006 and 2010 were an inherent element of 
election campaigns run by the opposition. 
Certain opposition leaders have also used this 
card of Russian support in their game in order 
to increase their own rank. Furthermore, unlike 
in the previous election campaigns, the Russian 
ambassador to Minsk Aleksandr Surikov already on 
10 June stated19 that Moscow will support Alyak- 
sandr Lukashenka in the upcoming election20. 
The negative balance sheet
So far the balance sheet of Alyaksandr Lukashen-
ka’s opponents should be assessed as negative. 
For years they have not only been unable to 
threaten his hold on power, they have not even 
moved closer to the realisation of any of their 
declared fundamental objectives: presenting 
themselves as an alternative, attractive political 
option and convincing the broadest sections of 
society to believe in the idea of democratic and 
economic transformations. 
18 It should however be stressed that the vast majority of the 
opposition leaders supported the Ukrainian protests and 
Uladzimir Nyaklyaeu made a speech at Kyiv’s Maidan. 
19 For example, before the election in 2010 a Russian infor-
mation campaign against Lukashenka was organised: on 
Russian leading TV channels a series of materials which 
were critical and full of accusations were broadcast.
20 Compare http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/1185606 
The Belarusian regime has succeeded in impos-
ing its own rules of the game on the opposi-
tion and in relegating it to the margins of social 
life. However, it is in the regime’s interest for 
a weak, marginalised opposition to take part 
in the election. The opposition does not pres-
ent a threat to Lukashenka’s power and its par-
ticipation in the election tends to be used as 
an argument proving the democratic character 
of the political system in Belarus. This is impor-
tant for Minsk, particularly in the context of the 
attempts made by the Belarusian government, 
against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, to normalise its relations with the 
West. However, at present, unlike before the 
presidential election in 2010, these attempts 
are not accompanied by even the pretence 
of internal liberalisation. On the contrary, 
the government is ostentatiously applying 
more pressure on political prisoners and in-
dependent circles. This should be expected to 
continue during the election campaign proper. 
The Belarusian government has drawn conclu-
sions from the 2010 election campaign. At that 
time even a controlled relaxation of the inter-
nal situation (allowing seven opposition can-
didates to run for the election, granting more 
space to public canvassing) consequently led 
to post-election protests and then an internal 
crisis and Belarus’s deeper isolation in the in-
ternational community. The central authorities 
in Minsk will therefore seek at all costs to avoid 
repeating this situation.
The Belarusian regime has succeeded 
in imposing its own rules of the game 
on the opposition and in relegating it to 
the margins of social life.
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APPENDIX
The main opposition political formations:
• BPF Party21,  
leader Alyaksey Yanukevich
• Conservative-Christian Party – BPF,  
leader: Zyanon Paznyak (he emigrated in 1996; 
the acting chairman: Yury Belenki)
• United Civic Party, 
leader: Anatol Lyabedzka
• Belarusian Left Party ‘A Just World’,  
leader: Syarhey Kalyakin  
(until 2009 – Belarusian Party of Communists)
• party Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly,  
leader: Stanislau Shushkevich
• Belarusian Social Democratic Party  
(Assembly),  
leader: Iryna Veshtard
21 Both the BPF Party (BPF) and the Conservative-Christian 
Party – BPF state that they have their roots in the legacy 
of the Belarusian Popular Front which was established at 
the end of the 1980s as a social movement. From 1993 
the BPF operated officially as a registered political party, 
and in 1999 it was divided into two parties.
• Belarusian Social Democratic Party  
(People’s Assembly), (not officially registered22) 
leader: Mikalay Statkevich 
(at present he is serving a prison sentence; 
his deputy is Alyaksandr Arastovich)
• Belarusian Party ‘The Greens’,  
leader: Alyeh Novikau
• ‘Movement for Freedom’,  
leader: Alyaksandr Milinkevich
• ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign,  
leader: Andrey Dzmitryeu
• Belarusian Christian Democracy party 
(organisational committee),  
leaders: Vital Rymasheuski, 
Pavel Sevyarynets, Heorhi Dmitruk 
• ‘European Belarus’ campaign,  
leader: Andrey Sannikau (he left Belarus in 2012)
22 In Belarus there are 15 officially registered political par-
ties. The last registration took place in 2000. Since then 
the Belarusian government has turned down the regis-
tration of new parties many times. With this regard cer-
tain parties often operate as organisational committees. 
